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We present a simple game whih mimis the omplex dynamis found in most natural and soial
systems. Intelligent players modify their strategies periodially, depending on their performanes.
We propose that the agents use hybridized one-point geneti rossover mehanism, inspired by
geneti evolution in biology, to modify the strategies and replae the bad strategies. We study the
performanes of the agents under dierent onditions and investigate how they adapt themselves in
order to survive or be the best, by nding new strategies using the highly eetive mehanism we
proposed.
The behaviour of most of the omplex systems found
in natural and soial environments an be harater-
ized by the ompetition among interating agents for
sare resoures and their adaptation to the environment
[1, 2, 3, 4, 5℄. The agents ould be diverse in form and
in apability, for example, ells in an immune system to
great rms in a business entre. In these dynamially
evolving omplex systems the nature of agents and their
manners dier. In order to have a deeper understand-
ing of the interations of the large number of agents, one
should study the apabilities of the individual agents.
An agent's behaviour may be thought of as a olletion
of rules governing responses to stimuli. For example,
if one sees a predator, then one should run, or if the stok
indies fall then one should take immediate ation, and
so on. Therefore, in order to model any omplex dynam-
ially adaptive system, a major onern is the seletion
and representation of the stimuli and responses, sine the
behaviour and strategies of the omponent agents are de-
termined thereby. In a model, the rules of ation are a
straightforward way to desribe agents' strategies. One
studies the behaviour of the agents by looking at the
rules ating sequentially. Then one onsiders adapta-
tion, whih is desribed in biology as a proess by whih
an organism tries to t itself into its environment. The
organism's experiene guides it to hange its struture
so that as time passes, the organism makes better use
of the environment for its own benet. The timesales
over whih the agents adapt vary from one system to
another. For example, adaptive hanges in the immune
system take hours to days, adaptive hanges in a rm
take usually months to years, and adaptive hanges in
the eosystem require years to several millennia.
In omplex adaptive systems, a major part of the en-
vironment of a partiular agent inludes other adaptive
agents. Thus, a onsiderable amount of an agent's eort
goes in adaptation to the other agents. This feature is
the main soure of the interesting temporal patterns that
these omplex adaptive systems produe. For example,
in nanial markets, human beings reat with strategy
and foresight by onsidering outomes that might result
as a onsequene of their behaviour.This brings in a new
dimension to the system, namely rational ations, whih
are not innate to agents in natural environments. To
handle this new dimension, game theory is used. It helps
in making deisions when a number of rational agents are
involved under onditions of onit and ompetition [6℄.
However, game theory and other onventional theories
in eonomis, study patterns in behavioural equilibrium
that indue no further interation. These onsistent pat-
terns are quite dierent from the temporal patterns that
the omplex adaptive systems produe.
In this letter, we study a simple game whih has most
of the disussed features of a omplex adaptive system.
The mixed strategies whih the agents use to deide the
ourse of ation must be good, espeially when the agents
have to be the best in order to survive similar to the idea
of survival of the ttest in biology. So just as an organ-
ism adapts itself in the natural environment, we propose
that intelligent agents in the game adapt themselves by
modifying their strategies from time to time, depending
on their urrent performanes. We also borrow the on-
ept of hybridization from biology and use it to modify
the strategies in the ourse of the game, in the same way
as in geneti algorithms [7, 8, 9℄. Therefore, our game is
a variant of the intelligent minority game introdued in
[10℄, based on the basi minority game [11, 12, 13, 14, 15℄.
In the game we study here, we use the mehanism of hy-
bridized geneti rossover where the two best strategies
of an agent serve as the parents whih it uses to re-
ate two new hildren using one-point geneti rossover
[9, 10℄ and then replaes two of its worst strategies with
the hildren.
Our game onsists of an odd number of agents N who
an perform only two ations denoted here by 0 or 1,
at a given time t. For example, the two ations ould
be buying and selling ommodities/assets. An agent
wins the game if it is one of the members of the minor-
ity group. All the agents are assumed to have aess
to nite amount of global information: a ommon bit-
string memory of the m most reent outomes. With
this there are 2m possible history bit-strings. Now, a
strategy onsists of two possible responses, whih in
the binary sense are an ation 0 or the opposite ation
21 to eah possible history bit-strings. Thus, there are
22
m
possible strategies onstituting the whole strategy
spae. In our study, we use the redued strategy spae
by piking only 2m unorrelated strategies, i.e., strategies
whih have Hamming distane dH = 1/2 [16℄.
At the beginning of the game, eah agent randomly
piks s strategies whih onstitutes its pool. Eah time
the game has been played, time t is inremented by unity
and one virtual point is assigned to a strategy that
has predited the orret outome and the best strategy
is one whih has the highest virtual point sore. The
performane of the player is measured by the number of
times the player wins, and the strategy, whih the player
uses to win, gets a real point. The number of agents
who have hosen a partiular ation, say 1, is denoted
by A1(t) and varies with time. The total utility of the
system an be dened as
U(xt) = (1 − θ(xM ))xt + θ(xM )(N − xt), (1)
where xM = (N − 1)/2, xt ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , N} ∀t, and
θ(xM ) =
{
0 when xt ≤ xM
1 when xt > xM .
When xt ∈ {xM , xM + 1}, the total utility of the sys-
tem is maximum Umax (= U(xM ) = U(xM + 1)) as the
highest number of players win. The system is more e-
ient when the deviations from the maximum total utility
Umax are smaller, or in other words, the utuations in
A1(t) around the mean beome smaller.
The players examine their performanes after every
time interval τ , and we all τ the rossover time. If
a player nds that he is among the fration n (where
0 < n < 1) who are the worst performing players, he
adapts himself and modies his strategies. The meha-
nism by whih the player reates new strategies is that
of hybridized one-point geneti rossover, whereby he se-
lets the two best strategies (parents) from his pool of s
strategies. Then using one point geneti rossover [9, 10℄,
he reates two new strategies (hildren) and replaes his
two worst strategies with the hildren. It should be noted
that our mehanism of evolution of strategies is onsid-
erably dierent from earlier attempts [11, 17, 18℄. Here,
the strategies are hanged by the agents themselves and
even though the strategy spae evolves ontinuously, its
size and dimensionality remain the same.
The time variations of the number of playersA1(t) who
hoose ation 1 are plotted in Figure 1. We observe large
utuations around the mean for the basi minority game
in Figure 1 (a). In Figure 1 (b), we observe the eet of
hybridized geneti rossovers on the utuations around
the mean. Interestingly, the utuations disappear to-
tally and the system stabilizes to a state where the total
utility of the system is at maximum, sine at eah time
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Figure 1: Plot to show the time variations of the number
of players A1 who hoose ation 1, with the parameters N =
1001, m = 5, s = 10 and t = 4000 for (a) basi minority game
and (b) our game, where τ = 25 and n = 0.6.
step the highest number of players win the game. As ex-
peted, the behaviour depends on the parameter values
for the system. For example, as we inrease m it is more
unlikely that the system stabilizes. Also, we have to in-
rease s, the size of the pool of strategies, in order that
the system stabilizes. The dependene of the system's
stability on these parameters is being studied in details
in [19℄. So the important fat here is that the behaviour is
totally dierent from the behaviour of the basi minority
game, where inreasing s usually leads to larger devia-
tions [11, 12℄. It is also interesting to note that starting
from a situation, similar to what is shown in Figure 1
(a), simply allowing the agents to adapt themselves by
modifying their strategies using the mehanism we have
proposed, drives the system towards a state where the
total utility is optimized.
In Figure 2, we further analyze some measures related
to the simulation in Figure 1 (b). If we plot the per-
formanes of the agents in a basi minority game, we
nd that the distribution of the performanes is quite
symmetri around the mean and the performanes of the
players do not vary remarkably during the game [11℄.
However, in our model the ompetition is very sti and
there are lots of ups and downs in the performanes, and
nally, when the system reahes an optimal state, the
players an be divided learly into two groups depending
on their performanes, as shown in Figure 2 (a). The
performanes in all ases are saled suh that the mean
performane is zero at every time step, so that we an
ompare them easily. Figure 2 (b) shows the evolution
of the history. Sine m = 5, there are 2m = 32 pos-
sible history bit strings denoted by a number between
1 and 32. Before the system reahes the optimal state,
histories vary over the whole range of possible outomes
as shown in Figure 2 (b). But after reahing the stable
state, the history is restrited to one value. So, one group
wins while the other loses ontinuously, depending on the
strategy spaes of the players. To study the dierenes
in the strategies of eah players' pool after the system
has reahed the stable state, we have alulated the av-
erage Hamming distane for the players' pools. Results
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Figure 2: Plots to show (a) the performanes of the play-
ers in our game for the best player (blak), the worst player
(magenta) and four randomly hosen players (blue, green, red
and violet), (b) the time variation of the history and () the
Hamming distanes for the nal pool of strategies for all the
players. The parameters used for simulations are N = 1001,
m = 5, s = 10, t = 10000 and τ = 25 and n = 0.6.
are shown in Figure 2 (). If all the strategies in a pool
are similar, average Hamming distane is zero, for unor-
related strategies, it is 1/2 and for totally anti-orrelated
strategies 1. Surprisingly, we nd that for most of the
players the average Hamming distane alulated for the
whole pool is zero, whih implies that the players have
evolved their strategies and found only one strategy for
use.
In order to study the eieny of the system, we have
introdued the study of the variation of the average total
utility of the system U(xt) with time t. The results are
shown in Figure 3. We nd that for the basi minority
game the total utility does not hange muh throughout
the ourse of the game. However, in the game we study,
we an learly see that the total utility of the system in-
reases as the time passes on and eventually saturates.
We an dene a harateristi time, alled the adapta-
tion time λ, during whih the total utility reahes a sat-
uration point. As intuitively expeted, the adaptation
time λ depends on the parameters of the system. We
defer the detailed studies and results for a future om-
muniation [19℄. It is interesting to note that this utility
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Figure 3: Plot to show the variation of total utility of the
system with time for the basi minority game for N = 1001,
m = 5, s = 10, t = 5000, and our game, for the same pa-
rameters but dierent values of τ and n. Eah point repre-
sents a time average of the total utility for separate bins of
size 50 time-steps of the game. The maximum total utility
(= (N − 1)/2 is shown as a dashed line. The data for the
basi minority game is shown in irles. The plus signs are
for τ = 10 and n = 0.6; the asterisk marks are for τ = 50 and
n = 0.6; the ross marks for τ = 10 and n = 0.2 and triangles
for τ = 50 and n = 0.2. We have taken ensemble average over
70 dierent samples, in eah ase.
measure is eetive in haraterizing an adaptive game.
In order to demonstrate that the players who adapt
themselves in the ourse of the game, by modifying
their strategies using the hybridized one-point geneti
rossover, we have tested the players in two dierent situ-
ations. The rst situation is where all the players play the
basi minority game but later we selet the worst player
and allow it to adapt itself and thus modify its strategies.
We nd that the player starts winning immediately and
eventually omes out to be a winner as shown in Figure
4 (a). Further, we hoose two other worst players at two
dierent times and allow them to modify their strategies
also. These two players too begin to perform very well.
We nd that the performanes of these hosen intelli-
gent players are muh better ompared to the normal
players of the basi minority game. The seond situa-
tion onsists of ten intelligent players who are apable
of modifying their strategies and the rest are normal
players who simply play the basi minority game. We
nd that the intelligent players perform extremely well
in omparison to the other normal players, and form a
separate group, as shown in Figure 4 (b). The ompeti-
tion amongst themselves is very sti as an be seen from
the inset of Figure 4 (b).
These two situations and the results learly show how
eetive the adaptation of agents an be in a om-
plex adaptive system. The mehanism of modifying the
strategies is also very suessful as it allows a player to
nd new strategies whih maximizes the players' indi-
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Figure 4: Plots to show the performanes of the players
(a) for three players who were the worst players in the ba-
si minority game at dierent times but started winning one
they started modifying their strategies using the hybridized
geneti rossovers (light blue, navy blue and green) and the
best normal player (blak), the worst normal player (ma-
genta) and two randomly hosen normal players (brown and
red) and (b) for the ten intelligent players who modify their
strategies using the hybridized geneti rossovers and luster
together in the winning group and the best normal player
(blak), the worst normal player (magenta) and six ran-
domly hosen normal players (blue, violet, red, green, or-
ange and brown). The inset of (b) shows performanes of ten
intelligent players who modify their strategies using the hy-
bridized geneti rossovers and luster together in the winning
group in a magnied sale The parameters used for simula-
tions are N = 1001, m = 5, s = 10, t = 10000 and τ = 10.
vidual utility. However, the total utility of the system
does not hange muh as the fration of adaptive players
is very small in both ases. It would be interesting to
study the variation of the total utility of the system with
the fration of adaptive players.
In summary, we have proposed a game where the play-
ers adapt themselves to ontinuously hanging environ-
ment, thus reproduing interesting temporal patterns
that are usually reated by omplex adaptive systems
in nature. The mehanism of adaptation we have intro-
dued here seems to be very eetive in all the ases we
have studied, as an be seen from the individual perfor-
manes of the players or from the measure of the total
utility of the system. The performanes of the players
in dierent onditions always seemed to be better when
they adapted themselves ompared to the players who did
not. We onlude that using this mehanism one ould
inrease remarkably the individual utility and the total
utility of the system as well, if the fration of adaptive
players is signiant.
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